In the past decade or two, an increasing number of migrants from countries neighboring Thailand have moved to Thailand temporarily or permanently in search for jobs and life security, causing an increase in the labor supply in the Thai labor market. This paper attempts to find economic contribution of these migrant workers to Thailand using various data sources and a collection of related findings. We find that capital gains from migrant workers show an increasing trend from around 0.03 percent of the real national income (880 million baht) in 1995 to around 0.055 percent of the real national income (2,039 million baht) in 2005. Using the adjusted labor share, the net contribution of migrant workers is on average 0.023 percent of the real national income per year, or around 760 million baht per year.
I. Introduction
In the past decade or two, an increasing number of migrants from countries neighboring Thailand have moved to Thailand temporarily or permanently in search for jobs and life security, causing an increase in the labor supply in the Thai labor market. Most of these migrants are known to be of working age and have low skills and low education. The wages paid to these workers are known to be lower than those for Thai workers, which might have contributed as a benefit to Thailand in terms of their 'cheap' labor cost. Although the positive contribution of these migrants are not yet clearly known , discussions among policymakers and various stakeholders involved increasingly focus on the negative impacts these migrants might have caused, especially on the unskilled Thais and on the costs to the government to provide basic rights to these migrant workers.
This paper attempts to find economic contribution of these migrant workers to
Thailand using various data sources and a collection of related findings. Section II provide estimates of the number of irregular migrants in Thailand and describes the characteristics of these workers. Section III describes informal labor markets in Thailand in which most migrants workers are concentrated. Section IV presents economic contributions from migrant workers to Thailand in terms of (1) the net gain, the labor losses, and the capital gains using a classical assumption in the labor market model and (2) the migrants' contribution in terms of cost competitiveness. Section V discusses the future trend of migrant workers and its implications to the Thai labor markets.
II. Irregular Migrants in Thailand

The Number of Irregular Migrants in Thailand
Even though different sources of migrant data give different estimates of total migrant number, one can observe that the total number of migrants from Myanmar, Laos, and
Cambodia has increased significantly in the past decade. Table 1 Another source of data is from the 2007 database from the Ministry of Interior.
According this database, the total number of migrant registered with the Ministry of
Interior at the beginning of 2007 is approximately 2.8 million (Table 2) . (Bryant and Rukumnuaykit, 2007) . 
Characteristics of Irregular Migrants in Thailand
The data from the Ministry of Labor (Table 4) show that most irregular migrants in Thailand are in working ages (15-60 years old). Working-age population of these migrants accounts for 93 percent of all migrants in 2007. There were more male than female migrants (1,578,424 vs. 1,228,270) , especially among the working-age population (1,480,143 vs. 1,137,224) . The distribution of migrant workers by country of origin and sex is shown in Table 5 .
The proportion of male migrants from Myanmar and Cambodia is higher than that for female migrants while there were more females than male migrants from Laos. The proportion of male migrants to all migrants was about 56 percent. Although there is no dataset that can be used to clearly examine the education of irregular migrants in Thailand, migrants from Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia are believed to have low education and low skills. According to Sussangkarn (1996) , about 75 percent of migrant workers in Thailand in 1995 worked in agricultural sector, 20 percents worked in low-skill industries, and 5 percent worked in service sector. According to the same study, in 1995, about 93 percent of Thai workers in agricultural sector and about 78 percent of Thai workers in low-skill industries had primary education or less.
Even though these migrants are of low education and low skills, they are demanded by employers in some sectors in Thailand. Punpuing et al. reported the attitude of employers that a high proportion of employers in agricultural and domestic work sectors thought that "migrants are good for Thailand because they are cheap" (Punpuing et al., 2006) . However, less than half of employers in livestock, fishing, and manufacturing sectors agreed with the statement. 
III. Migration and Informal Sector
Similar to the labor markets in many other developing countries, the Thai labor market consists of a large proportion of workers who are non-wage employees and who work in the informal sector. Non-wage workers are classified as (1) ownaccount workers and (2) unpaid family workers, which accounted for, respectively, about 32.7 percent and 25.5 percent of total employment in 2003. The sum of those two is the ratio of workers in the informal sector to total employment. These workers might be considered by the Labor Force Survey as non-wage workers; this includes workers who work in an enterprise that typically operates on a small scale with a low level of organization. 45 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Source 80 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Family-ow n w orkers Ow n-account w orkers Workers in informal sector Source: Authors' calculation. Data collected from Thailand's Labor Force Survey
On average, the real wages of salaried employees or workers in the formal sector are about 2.2 times higher than those of workers in the informal sector. The gap became larger when the boom decade started. In 1987, the real wages of workers in the formal sector were about 1.8 times higher than those of workers in the informal sector. In 1996, real wages of workers in the formal sector were about 2.6 times higher than those of workers in the informal sector. It sounds intuitive to say that the wage rates of salaried workers are higher than those of informal workers. 5 Since the majority of informal workers are unpaid family workers, and about 85 percent of such workers are employed in the agricultural sector, the wages of those workers are much lower than those of the workers in the manufacturing sector.
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Since 75 percent of migrant workers in Thailand work in agriculture sector, we can predict the direct impact of migrant workers especially on informal labor market. As previously explained, the wage of informal workers are relatively constant and lower than the wage of formal workers as a whole, an increase in the supply of migrant workers should result in the decrease in the wage of informal workers, which by the end could widen the wage gap between formal and informal sectors. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Wage rate of salaried workers Wage rate of workers in informal sector
Average wage workers
Source: Author's calculation. Data collected from Thailand's Labor Force Survey
IV. Economic Contribution from Migrant Workers
A number of researches on the impacts of migration in developing countries have focused on social aspects of receiving and sending countries. However, direct studies on the measurement of economic impact in receiving countries are increasingly an interest of policymakers involved, especially in a case of the Thai economy, which is a major host of migrants in the South-East Asia. In order to measure economic contributions from migrant workers, income share of labor (to the real national income) must be estimated since labor income share has a direct effect on labor productivity and living standard of Thais.
Evolution of Labor Share and Capital Share
This section analyzes the dynamics of factor share in Thailand during the period 1980-2005. In macroeconomics, factor shares are calculated within aggregated terms of national account. The National Income and Product Account (NIPA) denotes the composition of the nominal value added, which comprises the total nominal wage bill and total nominal profits. Therefore, the share of labor in the value added output is computed as a ratio of the total wage bill to the value added in real terms. 7 NESDB is a Thailand's central planning agency; it arranges NIPA to provide the following series: the value added in both nominal and real terms and the total wage bill in terms of "compensation to employees." 8 Therefore, the "raw labor share" of Thailand is constructed as the ratio of the compensation to employees to GDP at factor costs. 9 As shown in Figure 1 , the series displays a slightly increasing trend, with a mean of 0.36, maximum value of 0.42, and minimum value of 0.31.
However, as commonly occurs in most developing countries employee compensation differs from labor income (Gollin, 2002) . Labor income also includes some important parts of non-wage compensation, rents from particular jobs, and the returns to entrepreneurs. These specific components comprise the labor income of the people who are not wage-employees. Also in Thailand, a large proportion of the total labor force includes workers who are registered as "own-account workers" and
, where VA n is the nominal value added, W n is the nominal wage bill, and n ∏ is the
, where s L is the raw labor share and s k is the raw capital share. 8 Compensation to employees in NESDB calculations consists of (i) wages and salaries and (ii) employers' contribution of social security, which are workers in the formal sector. 9 Provided by NESDB, GDP at factor cost = GDP at market price -indirect taxes + subsidiesprovision for consumption of fixed capital.
"unpaid-family workers," who do not receive regular earnings in terms of wages and salaries.
10 NESDB measures this part of labor income (or profits) as "Income from Unincorporated Enterprises" (IUE). The share of IUE represents a mixture of both wages and profits allocated to own-account workers, including small production units that are generally owned and managed by households.
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Also shown in Figure 4 , the share of IUE (the ratio of IUE to the value added)
decreased from 0.580 in 1980 to the minimum level of 0.305 in 1996. The ratio then started to increase after 1996. The upward trend of the IUE share during the period 1996-1999 was generally a result of decreased income of informal workers during crisis period. Nonetheless, to compare between both series, in 1980, the share of IUE was about twice as large as that of the compensation of employees. However, it dropped significantly in 1988.
In Figure 4 , the share of the IUE and the raw labor share move in opposite directions. The long-run changes resulted in a shift in the structure of employment out of the agricultural sector. This structural change increased the proportion of wageearning workers, who used to be self-employed. This phenomenon is known to exist during transitional periods in many developing countries. The transition is due to a substantial increase in wage earnings in the manufacturing sector over the periods of economic development. Hence, a large number of workers from the agricultural sector decided work in manufacturing sectors where wages and salaries were higher.
As a result, we observe that the labor share and the UIE share move in opposite directions. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the raw labor share could be underestimated since some specific unmeasured incomes are not included in labor compensation. As a general rule of thumb, labor's share of income is assumed to be about two-thirds that of the national income-although the exact figure is sensitive to specific data used to calculate the ratio. We apply the methodology of "two" 10 In 2000, there were approximately 1.93 million own-account workers in Thailand. The majority of the own-account workers are in the agricultural sector (47.2 percent), commerce sector (23.9 percent), manufacturing (8.7 percent), services (9.8 percent), transportation and communications (5.8 percent), and others (4.6 percent). 11 Many studies define these as income of self-employed workers, which refers to income for ownaccount workers as well as the profits of unincorporated enterprises. Examples of own-account workers are doctors, barbers, and retailers, who work in independent units. They supply all the factors of production themselves and do not manage the accounts of production factors separately. Regarding the NESDB definition, income from unincorporated enterprise is defined as "Income from Farms, Professionals, and other Unincorporated Enterprises. 60 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Raw Labor Share Share of Income from Unincorporated Enterprise Source: Authors' Calculation. Data collected from NESDB.
Differing from the raw labor share shown in Figure 4 , the adjusted labor share shown in Figure 5 displays a decreasing trend before the crisis. The adjusted labor share has a mean value of 0.73, maximum value of 0.83, and minimum value of 0.62.
The adjusted labor share grew positively during the crisis period, with the average adjusted labor share being 0.62 percentage points per annum. The data clearly indicate that the financial crisis seems not to have caused any adverse shocks for the labor 12 Adjustment 1 is computed as the ratio of the sum of shares in GDP of the compensation of employees and the share of UIE to one minus the share in GDP of indirect taxes and subsidies, and provision for consumption of fixed capital. Since this adjustment counts the share of UIE as labor income, the labor share found in this adjustment has a mean of 0.800, declining from 0.898 to 0.691. Adjustment 2 is computed as the ratio of the share of compensation of employees in GDP to one minus the share of UIE and minus the share of indirect taxes, subsidies, and provision for consumption of fixed capital. Because UIE is treated as a composite of income and profit rates, the labor share in Adjustment 2 should be lower than that of Adjustment 1. We find that Adjustment 2 has a mean of 0.652, declining from 0.757 to 0.557.
share. Even though the nominal output sharply dropped during the crisis, the total wage bill was relatively stable during the period considered. 85 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Source: Authors' Calculation. Data from NESDB.
Measuring Economic Contribution from Migrant Workers.
We can estimate migrant contributions to the Thai economy by using a basic labor market equilibrium model. An in-flow of migrants to Thailand increased labor supply. This expansion in labor supply shifts the labor supply curve to the right by exactly the amount of migrant workers, resulting in lower wages and higher national income assuming that the demand curve is downward sloping. Suppose these migrant workers shifts the labor supply curve to the right from s L to s L′ , resulting in the new equilibrium wage at w', the surpluses to capital (and land owners) and workers will change. Rectangle B measures previously existed surplus in the receiving economy that is now transferred from native workers to owners of capital and land. When the labor supply shifts to s L′ , the economic expansion results in an increase in labor income by rectangle E and a gain to capital and land owners by triangle C. Since the increase in labor income E will be received by migrants, the net gain to the receiving country's economy is measured by only the triangle C, which is the net increase in the returns to capital and land.
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To calculate the size of triangle C, the net gains of labor from migrant workers as the ratio of national income, we need to calculate three parameters, 1) the wage decrease due to a percentage point increase of migrants ( w w Δ ), 2) the share of migrant worker to the labor force ( L M ), and 3) the labor share of national income ( VA wL = s L ), using the following formula:
These calculations can be made for the entire economy or for particular sectors in which migrants are concentrated. However, due to the limitation of labor market data by sectoral differentials, especially the lack of data on the number of migrants in each sector, this paper will focus on the entire economy. 15 If the labor demand curve is horizontal, meaning that wages did not fall as employment expanded, migrants would receive all the gain from their employment in wages and there is no economic benefit. However, over a longer time frame the economy will grow as a result of higher demand from a bigger labor force. Employers will create more jobs and new business will be formed. In this case, labor demand curve will shift out. From the result found in Table 9 , using adjusted labor share, a 0.023 percent reduction of wage deteriorated earnings of Thai workers (Area B) around 1.6 percent of the real national income, or around 505 million baht. 16 On the other hand, this lower wage was beneficial to the Thai owners of non-labor input (let's say 'the capital and land owner'). These capital owners received more capital share One of the arguments advocating the inflow of migrant workers in receiving countries is that migration generally increases unskilled labor supply, which in turn keeps the overall wage low in the receiving country. For example, Kura, et al (2004) analyzed a case of shrimp production sector in Thailand. Migrant workers were concentrated in the shrimp-peeling jobs. Thailand was among the world leading shrimp exporters with a market share of 16 percent, surpassing any other countries in the region. Kura, et al (2004) claimed that the competitiveness of the shrimp industry in Thailand came from the fact that shrimp producers continued to pay low wage to workers, which was facilitated by their hiring a number of migrant workers. 
, where Q is denoted a form of production function Q = F(K,L) and MP L is the marginal product of labor. This is implied that ulcs is an interpretation of the firm's marginal cost and average cost curve important non-tradable input is labor. Thus, the unit labor cost (i.e., labor cost per unit of output) could be a particularly useful indicator of cost competitiveness.
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This section discusses competitiveness in Thailand, measured by the unit labor costs (ulcs), which is affected by migrant workers. Algebraically, ulcs are calculated as the ratio of the nominal wage rate (dollars per worker) to labor productivity, which is the quantity of output produced per worker. In aggregated terms, the real value added can be used as a proxy for quantity of output. The unit labor costs rise when compensation and benefits rise faster than labor productivity. The lower is the ulcs' value, the more competitive is the country's manufacturing sector.
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The competitiveness of the manufacturing sector is often measured by (i) a low level of nominal wages and (ii) an increase in labor productivity. Since these two variables are given in nominal terms, the ulcs are adjusted using GDP or some price deflator to obtain ulcs in real terms (denoted ulc1). 21 With an upward trend, ulc1 increased from 0.60 in 1980 to 1.34 in 2005. Since the labor share declined, an upward trend of ulc1 must be due to an increase in the GDP deflator. The increases in the GDP deflator should therefore indicate a loss of Thailand's cost competitiveness during the period studied.
Nevertheless, the higher ulc1 may not imply a loss in competitiveness for
Thailand when considering intercountry comparisons. By doing intercountry comparisons, the ulcs should be constructed considering not only the ratio of the nominal wage rate to labor productivity, but also the transformation of the local currency (Baht) to the numeraire currency (e.g., US dollar). The definition of ulcs can be further refined using a series of adjustments such as the price purchasing parity (PPP) exchange rate (the price-adjustment effect), which is the ratio of the nominal 19 See, for example, Turner and Golub (1997) , Felipe and Sapin (2004), and Pholphirul (2005) . 20 The unit labor cost in the manufacturing sector is a key determinant of competitiveness in traded goods markets. By focusing on costs rather than prices, using the unit labor costs takes away some endogeneity of the CPI and export price measures. Golub and Ceglowski (2002) mention some limitations of the unit labor costs. First, data on labor productivity and labor compensation, which are needed to compute the unit labor costs, are not always reliable and available on a timely basis. Second, these measures are not widely available for service sectors, which constitute a growing component of international trade. Third, labor productivity may exhibit short-run counter-cyclical movements. Fourth, the unit labor costs ignore other costs of production (e.g., intermediate goods, non-labor taxes, and capital costs).
, where P is the GDP deflator.
exchange rate (Baht/US dollar) in PPP terms. Thus, it implies that Thailand gained competitiveness not only because of low wages and high labor productivity, but also because of the depreciation of the Baht against the US dollar. 22 The ulc2 may be defined as pure ulc effects with price-adjustment. It displays a downward trend, which indicates greater competitiveness of the Thai economy compared to other countries during the two decades concerned, which has a mean of 0.28, maximum value of 0.39, and minimum value of 0.21. 40 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 ulc1 (GDP Deflator) ulc2 (PPP and nominal exchange rate)
To measure the competitiveness of the Thai economy from migrant workers, we use the survey results from the Asian Research Center for Migration (ARCM, 2000) of Chulalongkorn University, which indicate that migrants should be paid, on average, around 70 percent as much as payments to Thai workers. 23 The ARCM 22 To compare the computed unit labor costs among countries, the use of purchasing power parities (PPPs) is adopted. We then multiply the ulcs (after the PPP adjustment) by the current nominal exchange rate in order to convert the local-currency price (Baht) to a numeraire currency, generally the US dollar). This is called the "price adjustment effect." So
, where should be paid for Thai workers. Policymakers in the 50 provinces, in which the survey was conducted, also thought that migrants should be paid 80 percent as much as Thais workers, and the Thai workers interviewed thought that migrants should be paid 74 percent as much as they received. Even the migrants interviewed thought that Thais should be paid more than they received. Based on this result, since migrants and native workers are not treated equally in terms of wage compensation, we assume that migrant workers will be paid around 70 percent as much as the Thai workers. Lower the wage of migrant workers therefore implies a higher competitiveness of the country. (2000) However, since the majority of migrant workers are unskilled, we simulate their contribution by assuming that migrant workers are 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent as productive as Thai workers. To measure the effect on the competitiveness of the Thai economy from migrant workers, the unit labor costs (ulc1 and ulc2) are calculated using the weighted average of the unit labor cost with migrant workers and the unit labor cost without migrant workers. 
Even though migrant workers receive lower wages comparing to Thai workers, it does not necessarily mean that employing migrant workers will enhance the country's cost competitiveness. Results found from Table 12 and Table 13 show that, based on different level of assumed productivity of migrant workers, the unit labor cost (both ulc1 and ulc2) is lower only when migrant workers are as about productive as Thai workers. In this case, employing migrant workers increases the country's cost competitiveness. Thailand's Ministry of Labor indicated that there were nearly 60,000 skilled foreign workers in the country, the majority being from Japan (23.3 percent), followed by the U.K. (8.8 percent), India (8.8 percent), China (7.8 percent), the U.S.A. (7.0 percent), Taiwan (6.3 percent), and others (38.0 percent). Positions filled are generally managers and executives, professionals, and technicians. In addition, trade liberalization increases job opportunities not only for Thai workers, but also for international irregular migrant workers residing in Thailand.
These migrants are mostly unskilled immigrants working mostly in the informal sector, who generate high economic benefit but also social costs for the Thai economy.
Thailand hosts foreign unskilled immigrants from neighboring countries such as Myanmar (80 percent), Cambodia (8 percent), and the Lao PDR (7 percent), many of whom are working and/or residing in Thailand illegally. As trade liberalization under AFTA becomes more effective, it is likely that intra-ASEAN trade will grow dramatically, not only in goods but also in services. The targeted priority areas of the trade in services include financial services, maritime transport, air transport, telecommunications, tourism, construction, and business services.
In addition, the appearance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will definitely play a vital role in economic development. Therefore, with free trade of both goods and services resulting from a closer economic integration, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers is expected not only to expand regional trade dramatically, but also to enhance industrial competitiveness of ASEAN member countries in a cost-efficient way. One such way is to rely on foreign immigrants, who are paid lower wages. However, labor migration is expected to generate one of the most salient social and political problems. Labor migration today, in the case of Thailand, occurs mostly, for both legal and irregular migrants, as "cross border" movement. Cross-border migration is often pictured as a threat to national security and a cause of many social problems in the country of destination. Such problems arise from the causes of migration itself, namely, unequal socioeconomic development levels among countries which result in the arrival of job seeking migrants from lower per capita income countries (economic refugees) as well as disequilibrium of demand and supply of the labor market.
Once irregular migrants have arrived in the target country, there are costs imposed to the host countries, for example, the costs borne by public hospitals to care for these migrant workers. Irregular migrants are also often blamed for causing the crime rates to rise in the host countries. The trend toward economic and trade liberalization and thus toward inward flows of population movement among the ASEAN countries is believed to become an even more significant problem in the future. With an inventory of the current problems, national policies to deal with trade liberalization should also include migration policies that identify what role ASEAN can be expected to play in helping manage the irregular migrants in the host countries.
Within AFTA, it is likely that some industries will prosper and grow and thus absorb some of the unemployed in their own countries, thereby reducing the number of migrants seeking job opportunities in the countries. Similar to Malaysia and Singapore, with the growth prospect from economic liberalization, Thailand will possibly face a more serious shortage of skilled manpower in, for example, accounting, engineering, and information technology (IT). At the same time, the immigration to Thailand of unskilled workers from Thailand's neighboring countries should also be expected to increase as demand grows, especially in labor-intensive industries such as agriculture and fisheries, as well as in domestic employment (gardeners, maids, nannies, etc.). The "new" ASEAN member countries, which share borders with Thailand (the Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Myanmar), will most likely contribute to the influx of illegal and unskilled labor in the future as AFTA's schemes are fully implemented at the same level as they have been for the original ASEAN-6. 25 With costs and benefits from these irregular migrant workers in mind, Policymakers in Thailand should carefully manage these natural flows of migrants in a way that maximizes the benefits to Thailand and minimize the costs to both unskilled Thai workers and the migrants themselves.
